Tavern of two oceans : alcohol, taxes and leases in the seventeenth-century Dutch world by Groenewald, Gerald
Tavern of two oceans: Alcohol, taxes and leases in the 
seventeenth-century Dutch world 
 
Gerald Groenewald 
University of Johannesburg 
ggroenewald@uj.ac.za 
 
Abstract 
 
The retail of alcohol was so central to the economy and society of the Cape of 
Good Hope during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that it earned the 
nickname “tavern of two oceans”. This retail business was organised on the so-
called lease or monopoly (pacht) system whereby a person paid the authorities 
for the right to sell a certain type of alcohol for a given period in a specific area. 
This paper traces the intellectual origins of this system of alcohol retail at the 
Cape during the VOC era. It does so by tracing both the idea of using leases or 
monopolies, first in the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century, and by 
investigating the ways in which various products, including alcohol, were leased 
off in the largest and most significant of the VOC’s colonies, Batavia, during the 
first half of the seventeenth century. It is demonstrated that the ways in which 
alcohol retail and other economic activities were organised at the Cape 
developed out of practices established elsewhere in the seventeenth-century 
Dutch world, but that the exact nature of the system was adapted to unique local 
circumstances at the early Cape. As such, this comparative article serves as an 
illustration that developments at the Cape in such a central sphere as business 
practices were the product of both global and local forces and influences.  
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Introduction 
 
For the past generation or so, historians who investigated globalisation in the 
early modern period have tended to focus on oceanic “systems” – first the 
Atlantic World and more recently those of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. But 
much of this scholarship was segregated – Atlantic history was dominated by 
historians of European expansion to the Americas, who only looked at Africa in 
terms of how the slave trade fitted into larger-scale economic developments of 
this region. These scholars tended to ignore developments on the other side of 
Africa, in the Indian Ocean, as if the Atlantic was a bounded or closed-off space 
with no cross-oceanic connections. Lately the Atlantic paradigm has been 
challenged “as artificially limit[ing] the field of vision of its devotees.”1 Thus 
scholars like Alison Games and Peter Coclanis have demonstrated how the 
Atlantic World was connected with other parts of the globe during the early 
modern period.2 This interconnectivity becomes particularly clear when 
investigating two different phenomena: the place of southern Africa (including 
Madagascar) as an oceanic cross-road and the flows of commodities and other 
goods between different continents.  
 
Although in economic terms the Cape of Good Hope was of fairly minor 
importance during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, its strategic position 
as the gateway between the Atlantic and Indian Ocean Worlds makes it an 
excellent candidate to study the interconnectivity of the oceanic worlds during 
this period. Recently scholars such as Kerry Ward has shown how, far from 
being an isolated outpost on the fringes of empire, the Cape formed an integral 
part of a “network of empire” created by the Dutch East India Company.3 
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Connected as it was through a web of shipping networks which bound the Indian 
Ocean empire of the VOC together via the movement of people and goods, the 
Cape also connected this one oceanic world to another – that of the Atlantic 
world, in particular to the Netherlands from whence all VOC ships originated. In 
short, the VOC Cape acted as a pivot from between two different oceanic worlds 
and networks, and played a crucial role in the rise of a more globalised world 
interconnected through commerce.4 The purpose of this article is to demonstrate 
further how local developments at the Cape of Good Hope during the VOC era 
partook of larger global developments in the Dutch world (the Netherlands and its 
colonial world). More particularly, it aims to show how one important economic 
feature of the Cape originated from larger developments in the Dutch world but 
was metamorphosed by local circumstances into something unique. In this 
sense, what happened in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean worlds influenced local 
developments, but by no means were these mere importations – ideas and 
practices from elsewhere were always adapted to local circumstances. It is this 
ability of the VOC to adapt practices to local needs which helps to explain the 
success and longevity of the Dutch empire. The local and the global were always 
intertwined.  
 
One of the unusual features of the Cape during the VOC era was that from 1680 
to 1795 the rights to retail various types of alcohol were sold at a public auction 
to the highest bidders. In essence, the right to sell a specific type of alcohol at a 
specific place for a specific period of time was “leased out” (verpachten) – this 
became one of the major sources of direct revenue for the VOC authorities at the 
Cape. As Gerald Groenewald has shown, this system, while remarkably stable 
after 1680, did not arrive part and parcel with the Dutch in 1652, but had a 
troubled development during the first decades of European settlement, and it 
took almost a quarter of a century of various models being tried out before both 
the authorities and the free burghers at the Cape settled on the one which was to 
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remain in place for more than a century.5 But what were the origins of these 
ideas and were they unique to the Cape? In short, where does the idea of leasing 
or monopolising the right to retail various products come from? How was alcohol 
taxed in other parts of the Dutch world? In short, how did developments in the 
global empire of the Netherlands influence the local practice at the Cape? This 
article aims to trace these developments in two parts of this empire: the Dutch 
Republic of the seventeenth century and the first (and most important) of the 
VOC’s colonies in the Indian Ocean, namely Batavia in the years before the 
founding of the halfway station at the Cape in 1652. 
 
Batavia 
 
The pacht system at the Cape was not unique – the general idea was familiar to 
both the Dutch administrators and free burghers of the young colony. Tradition 
and precedent play an important role in much of the development of the early 
Cape. It is not for nothing that when the Council of Policy first decided to institute 
excise tax on retailed alcohol in 1665, its members justified their step by claiming 
that the coloniers in India (“colonists in the Indies”) had been subject to a similar 
tax.6 They were acting on a precedent, but since the system that developed in 
Batavia and the East Indies differed in certain respects from that of the Cape, 
and again shows up the unique importance of alcohol retail at the Cape, we need 
to consider its development in some detail. 
 
Within a few months following the Dutch conquest of Jayakarta and the 
establishment of the “rendezvous”, Batavia, the new authorities issued a placard 
instituting a “toll”, that is to say customs duty, on all goods entering or leaving the 
city. The justification for this was to compensate the Company for the “great 
losses and unspeakably excessive costs” (groote lasten ende 
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onuytspspreeckelycke excessive costen) caused by the recent war against the 
local populace of Java. In addition to this, it was also decreed that inn-keepers 
must pay a monthly sum for the right to sell arack and other hard liquor, as well 
as an excise tax on Spanish wine.7 This was, however, not sufficient – two days 
later further means “to improve and alleviate the heavy costs we have to endure 
every day” (tot soulagement ende vindinge van de swaere lasten dagelycx te 
dragen) were devised, namely to compel all publicans and alcohol retailers to 
obtain a licence every month at a set cost in order to be allowed to sell alcohol.8 
At first only wine and arack tappers were subjected to this, but in 1634 it was 
decided to extend this monthly licensing to beer tappers as well.9 With this, the 
tone for the future was set. Taxing virtually everything was a most useful way of 
supplementing the income of the Company.  
 
Soon it was also realised that it is easier to farm out the administration of some of 
this taxation, saving the Company the trouble, and bringing in an additional 
income by selling the right to collect the taxes. In 1622, the first verpachting  
(“leasing off”) in the history of the Dutch East Indies took place when the Chinese 
Jancongh was allowed, for one year, to collect on behalf of the VOC the toll 
levied on certain articles: birds’ nests, bird beaks, rhinoceros horns, diamonds, 
camphor and mijnak samara – seemingly all products with a special place in 
Chinese culture.10 This pacht (“lease” or “monopoly”) was expanded in 1632, on 
the recommendation of the Heren XVII, to include up to a third of all imports and 
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exports, and later fully one half.11 The concept was broadened from collecting 
customs duties to collecting other types of levies, when, in 1633, it was decided 
to verpachten the tax on the slaughter of animals in the city.12 Hereafter several 
similar rights were also sold. 
 
Concomitant with these tax-farming pachten, a different sort of pacht developed, 
the one associated with the Cape, namely one that meant control over a 
monopoly. This first happened with sirih-pinang,13 which only the pachters were 
allowed to sell, while all privately grown sirih and pinang had to be sold to them. 
At first the obligation to sell home-grown “sirih-pinang” to the pachters was not 
part of the pacht, but smuggling made the authorities reconsider this.14 Three 
years later some individuals obtained the right to buy all the tobacco imported to 
Batavia and to sell it to the populace at large.15 Yet a third type of pacht, one 
which came to dominate Batavian economic life, was instituted in 1631 when the 
management of, respectively, the meat and fish markets, were leased off. This 
pacht meant that a person was responsible for the running of the market – 
ensuring its cleansing, upkeep and every-day running – in exchange for a certain 
percentage of the price goods were sold at.16 A sort of combination of the tax-
farming type pachten and the latter management type, came into existence with 
the arack pacht of 1633, where the job of the pachter was to ensure that there 
was no illegal distilling of arack through the selling of monthly licences to distillers 
– in a way he both managed the industry, or the smooth running thereof, and 
collected the income from it.17  
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  Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek I, p. 282. In 1653 it was increased to 50%, Van der Chijs, 
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, pp. 112 & 202-203.  
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  Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek I, pp. 259-262. 
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During the first couple of decades it seems as if the pachten were sold ad hoc to 
individuals who applied for them, i.e. in each case an individual contract was 
drawn up, setting forth the terms and conditions, as well as what the pachter  
(“lease holder” or “monopolist”) had to pay in exchange for his pacht. Several 
new pachten came into being because individuals made offers to the authorities 
to take over a given aspect of the economic life in return for some form of 
income.18 In most cases, pachters usually paid their pacht penningen (the 
amount of money they paid for the lease) on a monthly basis, while their pachten 
were renewable after a year. Often the contracts stated that the current pachter 
would get preferential treatment at the expiration of the pacht.19 However, this 
seems to have changed in the 1650s when the pacht system was reviewed and 
standardised. One of the new innovations was that the various pachten would all 
be publicly verpachten in the Castle at the end of every year on terms and 
conditions which were made public some time before the event.20 The first time 
this happened, in 1655, it was not stated so, but from 1658 onwards it is always 
mentioned that the pachten would go to the “person who offered the most” 
(meest biedende),21 i.e. a measure of free-competition was introduced with the 
institution of a public auction, seemingly open to everybody who could produce 
the sureties and pay the pacht penningen.22 
 
At the end of 1658 the conditions of all the available pachten were published, 
which gives us a good opportunity to see to what an extent pachten had come to 
dominate the economic life of Batavia, as well as the astonishing variety of the 
system.23 Of the fifteen mentioned on this occasion, only one can be considered 
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  E.g. Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek II.., pp. 245 & 470-471. 
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, p. 213. 
21
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, p. 312. 
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  Pachters always had to produce two sureties when they took on the pacht. Before 1654 the pachters had to pay 
their pacht penningen at the end of every month. From 1654 onwards they had to pay two months in advance on 
acceptance of the pacht, Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek II, pp. 200-201. 
23
  The texts are in Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek II, pp. 314-321. A similar complete set 
survives from 1669, Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek II, pp. 491-506. 
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a strict monopoly, namely the right to control the making and selling of candles in 
the city (nobody was allowed to make candles for private use, but had to buy 
them from the pachter). Most of pachten were of the management type 
mentioned before. Thus we find people buying the right to manage and use the 
fruit of the coconut trees in and around the city (for the making of arack), or to 
control, respectively, the waege (weighing house) or the fish, meat and rice 
markets, as well as the pacht of the Company’s garden.24 Two fairly recent 
pachten, ones which caused much wrangling over the years but which were too 
lucrative to abolish, were the ones which controlled retail trade in the city.25 The 
“lease of the market sitters” (pacht der marcktsitters) enabled the pachter to 
demand from every person selling their goods on the market a daily fee for the 
privilege – in order to ensure his income, hawking in street was prohibited. 
Similarly, anyone who wanted to run a shop or wanted to sell goods in front of 
their houses had to buy a monthly “shop licence” from the pachter of the “lease of 
the shop licences” (pacht der winckelbriefkens). Closely related to this, was the 
pacht which controlled the right to have a little boat selling wares to ships in the 
harbour. Ostensibly, these pachters were managing these trades, but in effect 
this was just a different form of tax, with the pachters being used to administer it.  
 
There were also pachten which were out-and-out tax farms. Straightforward 
cases included the various leases relating to the right to use certain rivers to and 
from Batavia – anybody who wanted to transport anything had to pay a toll on it 
to the pachter.26 By far the most important, though, was the so-called “lease on 
the head money of the Chinese” (pacht van ’t Hooftgelt der Chinesen). This was 
                                                 
24
  Not mentioned amongst the ones of 1658, is the pacht of the Chinese “topbanen”, which were in essence 
licensed gambling houses. The pachter controlled the venues and everybody who set up a top table had to pay him a set 
sum of money, compare e.g. Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek II, pp. 240 & 499-500. In 1671 the 
government banned “toppen” as “zeer nadeeligh” and the pacht came to an end, Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch 
plakaatboek II, pp. 552-553. Other managemet type pachten which were later instituted, are: the management of the 
company’s mill, the “pacht van de houtsagerien” and a pacht which entitled the holder to be the sole provider of bags for 
and carriers of pepper, Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek II, pp. 325-327, 356 & 504. 
25
  Compare Niemeijer, “Calvinisme en koloniale stadscultuurP”, pp. 77-78. 
26
  Earlier, when the company had built a bridge, they decided to charge a toll, and this too was verpachten for a 
while, compare Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek II, pp. 207-208. 
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instituted during 1657 to help pay off the cost of the war against Bantam. The 
pacht controlled the collection of the hooftgelt (“head money”) every working 
Chinese male had to pay every month for the privilege of living and working in 
Batavia. In exchange for this monthly tax, the Chinese received a “note or little 
letter” (biljet off briefken) which they had to carry with them at all times, on pain of 
a hefty fine. This was, of course, nothing but a pass system, though a very easy 
way of generating income, considering that the Chinese were the largest single 
group of inhabitants in the city, even if, as the authorities claimed, it was a 
“bearable head money” (verdraechlyck hooftgelt). Officially the excuse was that 
the Chinese, unlike Dutch burghers, were exempt from tocht ende wacht (“guard 
and patrol duties”), i.e. militia service. Women and elderly or sickly males unable 
to work were excluded from paying this tax. 27  
 
The function of pachten was of course not just purely income-generating, but 
perhaps primarily a way of controlling and regulating a specific trade or aspect of 
the economy. Thus, when the Batavian authorities decided to verpachten half of 
the import and export duties (and not a third as had been the case previously), 
they stated specifically that this was done to curb private trade and to prevent the 
traffic of goods on which the proper taxes have not been paid.28 By having 
pachters whose livelihood and fortune would depend on making sure everybody 
is taxed who ought to be taxed, the Company could put a check on smuggling 
and illegal trading, thereby securing their own due income.29 One should keep in 
mind that the aim of mercantilist companies was not so much to obtain the 
highest possible profit, but rather direct and, above all, secure or safe profits: As 
Jan de Vries & Ad van der Woude  claimed: “In general, the Company’s policy 
                                                 
27
  The texts are in Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek II, pp. 251-52 & 314-15. In addition to 
these tax farms, there were also created later on, pachten which had to collect the taxes levied on i.a. tobacco, “sirih” and 
the import of rice and sugar, compare Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek II, pp. 340, 343 & 470-471. 
28
  Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek II, p. 187. The VOC instituted similar strict customs at 
another great port, namely Melakka, when they took it over; compare FS Gaastra, Bewind en beleid bij de VOC: De 
financiële en commerciële politiek van de bewindhebbers, 1672-1702 (Zutphen, Walburg Pers, 1989), pp. 136-137. 
29
  According to Niemeijer, “Calvinisme en koloniale stadscultuurP”, p. 77, the system of having “licentie briefkens” 
was primarily a measure to curb “de illegale concurrentie”.  
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was to use its dominant position P to achieve a stable, medium-term optimum 
rather than short-term profit maximization”. 30 An example of this dual function of 
pachten, i.e. both a source of income and a way to combat smuggling, comes 
from 1680 when the Heren XVII instructed the Batavian government to institute a 
new pacht. Note that this was during the same time when the VOC authorities 
not only wanted to decrease the expenditure of the Company, but also to control 
smuggling, as a result of which they were willing to relax the strict rules on 
monopolies.31 So, whereas previously private individuals in Batavia were not 
allowed to import food and drink from Europe, this now became legal, on 
condition that they had to pay a certain specified toll off gereghtigheyt  (“tax or 
excise”) on every item (worked out in extraordinary detail) when unshipping 
these. Of course, this would create an enormous amount of administration, so a 
new pacht was created for it, the purpose of which was to inspect the wares, 
determine the toll and exact the necessary sums. Most ingenious, indeed, but 
nobody in Batavia was willing to take on the pacht on the conditions set out by 
the Heren XVII, which led the Batavian authorities decide to shelve the idea, and 
to keep things “as they had been here before”.32  
 
This dual function of pachten was certainly also what was behind the system of 
running alcohol retail in Batavia. Seemingly anybody who wanted to33 and was 
willing to pay the costs could run a tap. From the very beginning, though, excise 
taxes had to be paid on the various types of alcohol, in addition to paying a 
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  J de Vries & A van der Woude, The first modern economy: Success, failure and preservance of the Dutch 
economy, 1500-1815 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 431. On the VOC as a mercantalist company, 
and its significance for the development of the Cape, see GJ Erasmus, “Die geskiedenis van die bedryfslewe aan die 
Kaap, 1652 tot 1795” (PhD, University of the Orange Free State, 1986), pp. 1-9 & 336-346. 
31
  Compare Groenewald, “More comfortP”, Historia 57 (1), 2012, p. 19 and Gaastra, Bewind en beleid, pp. 81-
85. 
32
  JA van der Chijs (ed.), Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek, 1602-1811: Deel III, 1678-1709 (Batavia & The 
Hague, Nijhoff, 1886), pp. 42-47, quote from p. 47. 
33
  The “voorschriften voor herbergiers en tappers” did state that the consideration for a licence would be “dat het 
eerlycke, bekende luyden syn ende die goet huys houden”, Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek II, p. 244. 
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monthly fee for the right, i.e. in modern terminology, to have a licence.34 There 
were no pachten for different types of alcohol as at the Cape, but simply one 
over-arching “lease of inn-keepers or tap licences” (pacht der herbergiers ofte 
tapbriefkens). The pachter’s only function was to sell every month to anybody 
who comes to ask for it, a licence which would permit that person to tap for one 
month.35 His was purely an administrative function, but it was implied that he 
would also ensure that there were no people tapping without having such a 
licence. To this end he had to keep a register of all licensed tappers,36 while all 
tappers had to clearly identify their taverns as such.37 To an extent, then, it was a 
management type of pacht in that it sought to control the trade, but mostly the 
pachter served as a tax farmer.  
 
To summarise this development: Fifty years after the foundation of Batavia, the 
system of pachten came to dominate almost every local economic activity in this 
cosmopolitan city.38 All the pachten together formed what the Company officials 
called the “general income of Batavia” and while it would be going too far to claim 
it as a major source of income for the VOC as a whole, its importance for the 
urban economy, and especially to balance off the expenditures of the city, was 
enormous. The pachten were of course predicated on the notion of protecting 
one’s market and ensuring a monopoly, crucial to the success of the mercantilist 
VOC, which might explain why they were viewed as a way of combating 
smuggling by the Company. They were the Company’s instruments of control 
                                                 
34
  On excise, see e.g. Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek II, pp. 103, 125-26, 237 & Realia: 
Register op de Generale Resolutiën van het Kasteel Batavia, 1632-1805: Eerste Deel (Leiden, Bataviaasch Genootschap 
van Kunsten en Wetenschappen, 1882), p. 466 (18 June 1641). Excise was only imposed on alcohol sold to publicans, 
not to general members of the public. Where tappers did not buy their alcohol from the VOC, but imported it, they had to 
pay, in addition to the excise, an import duty (“toll”), compare Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek II, p. 
477. For the need to have a licence, see e.g. Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek II, pp. 85, 243-244, 300, 
316, 492 and Realia I, p. 466 (12 March 1658). 
35
  Excise collection was not part of his job. That had to be paid when the tappers bought the alcohol from the 
Company, compare Realia I, p. 154 (19 August 1645). 
36
  Compare Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek II, p. 476. 
37
  Compare e.g. Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek II, pp. 244, 316 & 492-493. 
38
  Niemeijer, “Calvinisme en koloniale stadscultuurP”, p. 79. 
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over the economic activities of their subjects, while at the same time they also 
made it possible for the Company to benefit directly from these activities. For this 
reason, the VOC authorities expended much energy in policing the pacht system, 
while those who partook of it also had a vested interest in making sure that their 
investments were protected (which incidentally explains the longevity of the pacht 
system in the VOC world).39 Perhaps it is the complexity of the economic and 
demographic profile of Batavia, especially its rapid growth in the first five 
decades after its foundation,40 that explains the wide variety of pachten found 
there. While this complexity was exceptional, it seems though as if pachten 
eventually, in some form or another, came to be part and parcel of the whole of 
the VOC empire, even though it may not have been to the same extent as in the 
capital city.41 
 
The Dutch Republic 
 
However, one ought to keep in mind that the idea of leasing economic activities 
was not unique to the VOC, even though the extent to which the Company 
employed and enforced the system in its territories might have been 
exceptionable. The notion of farming out taxes had been around since Roman 
times, and certainly, in the Netherlands of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
                                                 
39
  There is much evidence from the criminal records at the Cape that the VOC authorities investigated any 
transgression of the rules governing the alcohol monopoly system. In addition, those pachters who had invested in them, 
made sure that their rights were not infringed by others, and did not hesitate to lay complaints with the fiscal (who had a 
vested interest in investigating such complaints since he part of the fines imposed would accrue to him) when they 
suspected others of not following the rules. For some examples and references to primary sources regarding this, see GJ 
Groenewald, “Kinship,  entrepreneurship and social capital: Alcohol pachters and the making of a free-burgher society in 
Cape Town, 1652-1795” (PhD, University of Cape Town, 2009), pp. 34-36. 
40
  Between 1632 and 1679 the population of the city quadrupled from 8 000 to more than 32 000, compare 
Niemeijer, “Calvinisme en koloniale stadscultuurP”, pp. 25-27. In the latter year, there were 232 free-burghers at the 
Cape, probably around 300-400 Company employees, and conceivably more than 600 slaves. 
41
  H Sutherland, “Eastern emporium and company town: Trade and society in eighteenth-century Makassar”, F 
Broeze (ed.), Brides of the sea: Port cities of Asia from the 16
th
-20
th
 centuries (Kensington, New South Wales University 
Press, 1989), pp. 113 & 123-124, mentions that pachten played an important part in the local economy and society of 
Macassar. Interestingly, during the seventeenth century there was only one pacht, to wit the alcohol monopoly, but during 
the 18
th
 century this system expanded to also include management and tax farm type pachten, as in Batavia. I know of no 
other study of pachten in the VOC empire.  
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centuries it was the dominant way of collecting money for the government. So, 
while pachten were adapted to the unique local circumstances of the 
cosmopolitan Indian Ocean city that was Batavia, these ideas have their origins 
in the Atlantic World.  
 
In the Dutch Republic the most important source of income for the various 
provinces which made up the Republic was the excises levied on virtually all 
consumer goods. Especially in the province of Holland, which had been studied 
in most detail, there was hardly any commodity that remained untaxed.42 These 
excises on the “common goods” (gemene middelen) became the cornerstone of 
the tax system and expanded to such an extent that there were more than 40 
different types of excise taxes in Holland alone by the turn of the eighteenth 
century. The importance of excises to the tax income of the province is well 
illustrated by the figures: during the 1630s about two-thirds of all taxes came 
from excise alone, and by 1650 this had increased to 83%. As a result, Holland 
became very heavily taxed, especially as cities added their own excises on top of 
the provincial ones.43 
 
The government itself did not gather these taxes, but leased them out 
(verpachten). In the province of Holland, the different excises were divided into 
seventeen districts, which meant that a total of 680 pachten were available. 
Usually, the right to gather these taxes was auctioned off to the highest bidder 
who could provide two sureties, normally for a period of six months. All the 
pachten in the province were sold on the same day, with the express aim to 
prevent a person from obtaining more than one. There seems to have been a 
                                                 
42
  AT van Deursen, Mensen van klein vermogen: Het kopergeld van de Gouden Eeuw (Amsterdam, Bert Bakker, 
1991), pp. 198-200. The States of Holland introduced excise taxes as early as 1583 but, while all the other provinces 
eventually also adopted this system of taxation, “the rates of taxation and the goods burdened with excise varied 
considerably”, De Vries & Van der Woude, First modern economy, p. 102. 
43
  De Vries & Van der Woude, First modern economy, pp. 103-106. England, which used to be relatively lightly 
taxed, primarily on land ownership, introduced excise taxes, “a system of indirect taxation modelled on Dutch precedents” 
in 1644, which eventually became the prime source of tax income for the state, compare K Wrightson, Earthly necessities: 
Economic lives in early modern Britain (New Haven & London, Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 256 (quote) & 258. 
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deliberate attempt on the side of the Dutch government to prevent the 
establishment of large tax farms such as those which existed in France and 
which were immensely unpopular.44  
 
Why did the Dutch authorities opt for excises and for pachters? Excise tax affects 
only a small number of people directly, namely the retailers and producers of 
goods, not the consumers, who of course paid indirectly through higher retail 
prices. It was therefore much more manageable than a more general tax, 
especially if one considers that early modern governments had no real way of 
enforcing their will – there was no police force and government bureaucracy was 
neglible.45 This system was also much more flexible – whenever the authorities 
needed more income, they could increase the excise or introduce new ones.46 
But why pachters? Once again, the state lacked the necessary administrative 
ability, but in addition, leasing out the collection of taxes meant that the system 
became much more predictable and thus stable: the government knew what its 
guaranteed income would be.47 However, not only do the authorities get the full 
amount of taxes with little or no trouble, but the unpopularity of paying taxes 
would not be levelled against them, but against the pachters – they were the 
ones getting their hands dirty and making life difficult for retailers, not the 
“regenten” themselves.48 This indeed happened in the Netherlands – pachters 
were not very highly regarded.49 Since the 1690s, the ever-increasing cost of 
living – the direct result of a large number of excises – led to periodic uprisings 
and riots, which usually took the form of common people attacking the pachters 
                                                 
44
  Compare Van Deursen, Mensen van klein vermogen, pp. 200-203 and De Vries & Van der Woude, First 
modern economy, p. 103. England too had its tax farmers, seemingly on the French model, as Wrightson, Earthly 
necessities, p. 256, refers to them as “the consortia of plutocrats who bought the right to collect taxes”. 
45
  Van Deursen, Mensen van klein vermogen, p. 208. 
46
  De Vries & Van der Woude, First modern economy, p. 102. 
47
  De Vries & Van der Woude, First modern economy, p. 103. 
48
  Van Deursen, Mensen van klein vermogen, p. 200. 
49
  Compare Van Deursen, Mensen van klein vermogen, p. 207: “Het publiek zag de pachter als een particulier 
profiteurP”. (the public saw lease holders as private profiteers).  
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in person or their houses.50 This reached it apogee with the so-called 
Pachtersoproer (“Pachter Disturbance”) of 1748, which started with angry mobs 
attacking the houses of pachters in Friesland in March, but eventually spread all 
over the country, with people plundering and sacking the houses of pachters in 
most of the Dutch cities during the following weeks. The result of this was that 
the States-General decided to suspend tax-farms.51 De Vries and Van der 
Woude claim that this uprising led to “the greatest political and fiscal changes in 
the Republic’s history”. At any rate, the pachten came to an end, and direct tax 
collection replaced it.52 Part of the reason for this was an attempt to remove 
power from the “regenten” and to create a more centralised state in which 
political power was consolidated in the hands of the stadholder. But linked to this 
– as was made clear by the pamphlets distributed by many of the rioters – was 
the reality that a system of monopolies led to corruption and that the “regenten” 
had been profiting from this for more than a century.53 This may be another 
reason for the popularity of tax farms and monopolies – both in the Dutch 
Republic and in the VOC empire – the fact that this system was so lucrative in a 
world beset by corruption and smuggling.54 
 
                                                 
50
  De Vries & Van der Woude, First modern economy, p. 123. Van Deursen, Mensen van klein vermogen, pp. 
207-8, cites examples of individual attacks on pachters, sometimes with fatal consequences.  
51
  On the “pachtersoproer”, see J Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its rise, greatness and fall, 1477-1806 (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 1072-1075 and JAF de Jongste, “The restoration of the Orangist regime in 1747: The 
modernity of a ‘Glorious Revolution’”, MC Jacob & WW Mijnhardt (eds.), The Dutch Republic in the eighteenth century: 
Decline, enlightement and revolution (Ithaca & London, Cornell University Press, 1992), esp. pp. 40-48. These unrests 
were part of a larger movement, the so-called “second Orangist revolution” which resulted in the re-insitution, after 46 
years, of the stadholdership which now became hereditary. 
52
  De Vries & Van der Woude, First modern economy, p. 123. 
53
  Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 1074. 
54
  The so-called ‘principal-agent problem’ was particularly severe in the case of the VOC empire due to 
information assymetries (caused by poor communication systems as a consequence of the the very wide geographic 
dispersion of the Company’s activities and employees) which made smuggling both easy and inviting. The use of 
monopolies and tax farms may partly have been a solution to this problem. This is an example of how chartered 
companies like the VOC “facilitated more effective rent appropriation through the closer manipulation of markets”; SRH 
Jones & SP Ville, “Efficient transactors or rent-seeking monopolists? The rationale for early chartered trading companies”, 
Journal of Economic History, 56(4), 1996, p. 913. My thanks to an anonymous peer reviewer for this reference.  
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It was in the Netherlands, then, that the idea for pachten had its origin. But it 
seems as if in Europe this term was mostly understood to mean the right to 
collect taxes within a certain industry or on certain goods. But there were also, 
albeit to a lesser extent, certain types of management pachten. De Vries and Van 
der Woude mention that, in addition to excises and property taxes, there was 
also “a miscellany of other taxes, fees, and tolls”, and make special mention of 
the “ubiquitous tolls for the use of roads, canals, locks, bridges and harbors”.55 It 
is likely that the management of these were also leased off at a local level. In 
addition, it is plausible that there were also monopoly type pachten in the Dutch 
Republic, especially where it concerned highly valuable or scarce commodities. 
An example of this is the case of fresh water fishing in seventeenth-century Graft, 
where the right to fish in fresh water, and presumably also to sell the produce, 
was verpachten annually to (usually) only one person, who may or may not have 
had partners or assistants, but in any case, was the only one allowed to exploit 
the valuable resource of fresh water fish.56 But what is clear is that the basic idea 
of leasing of (verpachten) existed in the Netherlands in the seventeenth century, 
and that this practice was metamorphosed in the Dutch colonies to suit local 
needs and developments, most spectacularly in the complex and cosmopolitan 
capital city of the VOC, Batavia.  
 
The Cape of Good Hope 
 
When the VOC established its halfway station at the Cape of Good Hope in 
1652, its employees were familiar with a system of excise taxes and, equally, 
with the notion to sell the right to collect certain taxes to a person. In addition, 
they also knew that certain privileges, due to their value, might be “leased out” 
(verpachten), i.e. the original right or ownership remains that of the authorities, 
but the use and management of it may be sold for set periods of time. This 
                                                 
55
  De Vries & Van der Woude, First modern economy, p. 108. 
56
  AT van Deursen, “Bronnen en hun gebruik: Het verpachtingsregister van de visgronden bij de sluis van 
Westgrafdijk”, R Sanders (ed.), De verleiding van de overvloed: Reflecties op de eigenheid van de Cultuurgeschiedenis 
(Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1991), pp. 55-64. 
 17
particularly developed in Batavia, largely as a way of controlling smuggling and of 
protecting the Company’s commercial interests, but with the useful side benefit of 
generating an extra income.  
 
At first alcohol retail was not considered something to be worried about too 
much, except to ensure that it did not lead to all kinds of “debauches” such as 
soldiers spending all their time and money in taverns, although it did serve as a 
useful way to provide the needy with a supplementary income.57 However, for a 
number of reasons, tapping took off at the Cape, and in 1665 the local authorities 
realised that it needed to be regulated and excise tax was levied as in Batavia 
and the Dutch Republic. The profitability of tapping and the lack of other 
economic opportunities made alcohol retail a much-desired occupation, with the 
result that the number of public houses proliferated, despite of the authorities’ 
attempts to curb this and concomitant smuggling. The solution they adopted was 
to institute alcohol pachten in 1673 whereby tappers had to buy the right to retail 
liquor.58 While the notion of verpachten was nothing new, considered against the 
background of developments in Europe and Batavia, the idea to let one person 
alone have the right to monopolise and manage the retail of one specific type of 
alcohol, seemed to have been novel – this was not on the Batavian model of a 
pachter who controlled the license fees of tappers. With this, the underlying 
principle of the alcohol pachten at the Cape was established, although it took 
another six or seven years for the other important characteristic of the system –  
namely that the pachten were sold at a public auction where, in principle, 
anybody with the necessary means could compete for it – to fall into place. By 
1680 the “most significant development in the progress of freeman tradeP” was 
established, to remain a stable feature of Cape life for more than a century and to 
form the cornerstone of the Cape’s economy.59 
                                                 
57
  E.g. by allowing poor widows to sell certain alcoholic beverages to supplement their income.  
58
  See Groenewald, “More comfortP”, Historia 57 (1), 2012, pp. 4-12 for a fuller discussion of these 
developments.  
59
  Quoted from M Whiting Spilhaus, South Africa in the making, 1652-1806 (Cape Town, Juta, 1966), p. 33. 
Groenewald has calculated that VOC authorities at the Cape received more than seven million guilders in direct revenue 
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Conclusion 
 
In the course of the eighteenth century, the Cape of Good Hope earned the 
nickname, “the tavern of two oceans”, from the many thousands of sailors who 
visited its shores on their way to or from the Indian and Atlantic Oceans.60 The 
many taverns and other public houses they visited during the course of their stay 
were governed by an unusual set of principles on which many travel writers to 
the Cape commented. Yet, just as the sailors formed part of a globalising world 
with many interconnections, so too did the ideas underlying the management of 
alcohol retail at the Cape. The alcohol pacht system was in essence the result of 
local developments which had their roots in principles well entrenched in the 
Dutch Republic but which were further transformed in the unique context of 
Batavia. As such the Cape was truly a tavern of two oceans – both in providing 
alcohol and the way in which this trade was managed and governed.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
from leasing out alcohol pachten between 1680 and 1795; Groenewald, “Kinship, entrepreneurship and social capitalP”, 
pp. 63-69. 
60
  Compare CR Boxer, The Dutch seaborne empire, 1600-1800 (London & New York, Methuen, 1965), p. 242. 
